Van cleve and the neglected alternative by DeLong, Jeremy C.
Van Cleve and the Neglected 
Alternative 
Jeremy Delong 
University of Kansas 
One of the most persistent worries voiced by students of Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason is the "neglected alternative objection" (NA). 
In setting out the components of his transcendental aesthetic, Kant 
explicitly states that space and time—respectively, the outer and in-
ner forms of sensible intuitions that underlie all our phenomenal 
experiences—are merely pure forms of sensible intuition. By this he 
means that they do not have any objective reality as things in them-
selves (i.e., they are not noumena).' It is crucial for Kant's overall 
project in the Critique, especially in relation to his "Copernican Revo-
lution," that both space and time be given a priori for us as necessary 
components of our experience. However, inferring from this that 
the independent existence of space and time can, or must be, denied 
outright seems irrelevant to Kant's overall project and, more impor-
tantly, an unjustified dogma inconsistent with the claims of the over-
all project. I take it that Kant leaves readers with the following two 
general questions: 
1) Motivation—If Kant thinks that space and time must neces-
sarily be a priori intuitions for our experiences, he must there-
fore deny the existence of space and time independent of our 
perception. Are there deeper philosophical motivations for this 
claim, and is Kant's overall project threatened if this claim is 
undermined? 
1 See Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith 
(New York: Palgrave, 2003). A49/B66, A369, A490-1/B518-19 to cite just a few 
instances. 
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2) lustification/Soundness—No matter Kant's own reasons for 
making the negative ontological claim regarding space and time, 
the question remains whether Kant is at all philosophically justi-
fied in making the inference. Considerations here include, but 
are not limited to, the seemingly contradictory Kantian tenet 
that we can have no knowledge of things in themselves. So, are 
there any good reasons for us to accept his claim? 
In short, the NA asks both why Kant holds, and whether he is 
justified in holding that space and time could not be "both a form of 
intuition and a form of things as they are in themselves?"2 In other 
words, why could the world not possibly be similar to the scenario 
described in the "red spectacles analogy"?—that just because one is 
wearing red-tinted spectacles and thus perceives everything to be 
reddish, it does not follow that the world, once the spectacles are 
removed, will not have been red to begin with.3 These questions will 
serve as the background inquiry for this paper. 
As this topic has been written on extensively over the years, I am 
not proposing to offer a particularly novel interpretation of how to 
explain either (1) or (2) above, or even to offer much of a literature 
review regarding the issue. Instead, my focus is to examine James 
Van Cleve's treatment of the issue in his Problems from Kant. In ana-
lyzing Kant's transcendental idealism and some of the traditional ob-
jections against it (including the NA), Van Cleve explicitly promises 
to "show that under [his] interpretation of the argument from geom-
etry, Kant has answers." 4 It seems reasonable that any truly satisfying 
treatment of the neglected alternative should provide responses to 
both (1) and (2) above. Van Cleve's proposed "solution" thus should 
be judged by how well he addresses them. 
However, less than one page later, when Van Cleve dismisses the 
NA outright on the basis of his particular empirically idealistic in-
terpretation of Kant, it is not at all clear how Van Cleve's interpre-
tation adequately responds to either, let alone both, aspects of the 
objection. At best, Van Cleve explains away the objection on the basis 
2 James Van Cleve. Problems from Kant. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999). Hereafter "VC". 
} V C 2 6 7 n . l 
4 VC 36.1 will subsequently refer to this as Van Cleve's "promise". 
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that it only exists due to naive understandings of Kant's commitment 
to idealism. However, when one attempts to apply Van Cleve's own 
more extreme interpretation of Kant's idealism as a resolution to the 
objection, it still remains mysterious why this is supposed to serve 
as an answer. This leaves the reader wondering if they are missing 
something important. Unfortunately, there is no help forthcoming 
elsewhere in Van Cleve's work, as these two pages contain the only 
explicit references to the NA in Van Cleve's entire book. My purpose 
is to clarify why Van Cleve believes he has explained away this objec-
tion so easily, and whether his proposal has any merit. I conclude 
that his proposal is completely devoid of merit, and there is no rea-
son to think Van Cleve's particular idealistic interpretation of Kant 
in any way helps resolve the NA. 
As I am only concerned with answers to the problems raised by 
the NA, Van Cleve's in particular, I will not engage with Kant's argu-
ments for space and time being necessarily a priori for all our subjec-
tive experience—I will take it as given that Kant has succeeded in 
establishing what Guyer refers to as Kant's "transcendental theory of 
experience." 5 What is at question here is the justification of Kant's 
"transcendental idealism"—How Kant can go from concluding that 
space and time is necessary a priori for our perception of objects to 
the conclusion that objects themselves necessarily lack spatial and 
temporal properties. In addition, in keeping with other commenta-
tors on this issue, and Van Cleve in particular, the specific arguments 
considered herein will relate only to space being denied ontological 
objectivity—the similarity of the arguments with time should gener-
ally follow suit. 
Van Cleve's Interpretation of Kant 
As Van Cleve's "promise" to resolve the NA explicitly states that 
the answers will be forthcoming on his interpretation of Kant's argu-
ment from geometry, which it is reasonable to assume could some-
what turn on Van Cleve's overall perspective on Kant, it is neces-
sary to first understand how Van Cleve views Kant overall. Van Cleve 
5 Paul Guyer. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987). 344. 
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believes the appropriate way to interpret Kant is as an "'honest-to-
goodness' idealist regarding the entire world in space and time." 6 Van 
Cleve does not mean, of course, that Kant is a total idealist—even Van 
Cleve will not deny that Kant believed that there are really things out 
there existing independent of us and thus committing him so some 
level of realism (the noumenal realm, or things-in-themselves). What 
Van Cleve is opposing are views of other Kant scholars that tend to 
describe the phenomenal realm as merely the result of a particularly 
human subjectivity imposing its particular viewpoint, composed of 
certain forms of intuitions, upon things-in-themselves. Here the phe-
nomenal is just our way of thinking about, viewing, or theorizing 
about the actually existing world, and as such may be very different 
from the way things actually are in themselves. This way of think-
ing about the phenomenal/noumenal distinction is common in the 
"one-world, dual-aspect" view of Kant that has become popular in 
the recent decades. 
Why is this not enough for Van Cleve? These views do not yield 
the result of making phenomenal objects depend upon us for their 
very existence. Instead, there is only one type of existent thing, a par-
ticular object, but two ways of describing it—how it really is (the 
noumenal) and how we know it in appearance (the phenomenal). 
Van Cleve thinks this level of realism is not supported by the text: 
By transcendental idealism, I mean the doctrine that appear-
ances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations 
only, not things in themselves, and that time and space are 
therefore only sensible forms of our intuition, not determina-
tions given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of objects 
viewed in themselves.7 
So, Van Cleve takes from this that space and time do not exist 
in themselves, and thus no appearances do either, as all phenom-
ena are viewed by us as spatially and temporally extended. The very 
existence of space and time must depend upon something if they 
do not ground themselves, and that "something" is us. Thus Van 
Cleve's conclusion that Kant is an "honest-to-goodness" idealist, in 
6 VC 4. 
7 Quoted in VC 5. KS 345. (A369). 
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the Berkeleyan sense of esse est perdp/'-appearances are completely 
mind-dependent. 
Furthermore, Van Cleve argues that appearances must have this 
sort of mind-dependence for Kant's Copernican Revolution to work. 
For by Kant's revolutionary inversion of our perceptive model, the 
object must conform to our knowledge rather than our knowledge 
conforming to what is actually out there in the world. Van Cleve 
thinks that no sense can be made of objects conforming to our 
knowledge unless they also depend upon us for their very existence. 
The intuition seems to be something like this: if objects exist inde-
pendent of us, how could our knowledge possibly affect properties 
of that object? However, if we bring the object itself into existence 
via the faculties of our mind, one can understand how we can affect 
its properties; for we give it the apparent properties it has in our 
cognizing it. 8 Van Cleve puts it this way: 
How is it possible for objects to owe any of their traits to our 
manner of cognizing them? The answer I find most satisfying 
is this: the objects in question owe their very existence to being 
cognized by us. An object can depend on us for its Sosein (its 
being the way it is) only if it also depends on us for its Sein (its 
being, period). It is in this way that the Copernican Revolution 
is bound up with idealism. I say more about how this is so in the 
next section and elsewhere (especially chapter 3). 9 
This particular passage will prove to be the key to Van Cleve's 
supposed solution to the NA, as is hinted at here by the parenthetical 
8 While virtually nothing Van Cleve says regarding the appropriate way to 
interpret Kant's idealism, here and in what follows, is lacking in controversy, as 
my purpose is not to evaluate his perspective overall but to evaluate whether 
his view offers any positive contribution to the neglected alternative objection, 
I treat all background information concerning Van Cleve as the antecedent 
to an hypothetical conditional: "If V.C. is right about Kant holding x, y, and z, 
does it thereby follow that the neglected alternative objection loses its force?" 
Since I hold the argument to be invalid, it would be superfluous to my pur-
poses to evaluate for soundness by arguing against the controversial premises 
themselves rather than simply showing the conclusion fails to follow from the 
premises. 
9 VC 5 
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notation promising to take up the issue again in chapter 3 (the only 
place the NA is mentioned). 
Based upon the above considerations, Van Cleve concludes that 
the traditional "two-world" view is a more appropriate way to in-
terpret Kant—that there are really two kinds of existent things in 
the world—the noumenal and the phenomenal. However, Van Cleve 
does not accept just any old "two-world" view, as he recognizes many 
problems with this view as well. In attempting to avoid these prob-
lematic issues, his interpretation requires not only that there be two 
different kinds of objects, but that one kind (the phenomenal) must 
be completely mind-dependent. We only talk of these phenomenal ob-
jects as "existing"—they are in fact merely "virtual objects," existing 
in relation only to our cognizing them, yet simultaneously lacking 
any sort of independent being. They are mere representations that 
may supervene upon, or in a sense even be caused by, things in the 
real world, but simultaneously lack any ontological existence them-
selves. Much as a tree's shadow moves across the lawn on a sunny day, 
we can speak of the shadow and have it represented to us, but we 
are not then simultaneously committed to positing the existence of 
a new object called a "shadow". A shadow's existence and apparent 
motion is completely dependent upon and explained by the other 
things and their relation between each other (e.g. the sun and its 
own movement, the lawn, and the shade tree that stands between the 
light from the former reaching the latter). 1 0 
For Van Cleve, "If Kantian appearances are virtual objects, then 
to say that someone is aware of an appearance of a certain sort is 
only to say that he is sensing or intuiting in a certain way."11 While 
we may predicate things of these "objects," and say that they "exist" 
in our awareness (if only for the sake of convenience), we are really 
only saying that we are sensing a particular sensation, not that the 
sensation exists independently of our perception of it. 1 2 While the 
details of this view are somewhat complex and certainly controver-
1 0 VC 9. The significance of this particular example for Van Cleve seems to 
be that shadows are not actually something, but in reality the lack of something 
(light) in a particular location, which only seems to be a separate existent thing 
due to our perceptual apparatus. 
" V C 9. 
1 2 VC 9. 
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sial, the only important concerns herein are 1) appearances are "vir-
tual objects" which do not in fact exist alongside noumenal objects 
out in the world but only occur in our minds, and 2) noumena are 
objectively real, while appearances are mind-dependent. I will sub-
sequently refer to this as Van Cleve's 2W1MD (two-world, 1 mind-
dependent) thesis. 
Van Cleve's Treatment of the "Argument from Geometry" 
The second part of Van Cleve's "promise" relates directly to his 
idealistic interpretation of Kant's "argument from geometry" (or 
at least Van Cleve's particular reconstruction of Kant's argument). 
Since this argument is what motivates Van Cleve considering the NA 
in the first place, we must examine it before continuing forward. 
Here is Van Cleve's reconstruction of the argument: 1 3 
1. We cannot construct [visualize] any cubes with more than 
eight corners (or, any polygons that do not have at least three 
sides, etc.) 
2. Therefore, there cannot be any cubes with more than eight 
corners. 
3. The inference from 1 to 2 must be legitimate—otherwise, 
there would be no accounting for our knowledge of geometri-
cal truths such as 2. 
4. However, the inference from 1 to 2 would not be legitimate 
if cubes were things in themselves. 
5. Therefore, cubes are not things in themselves, but only ap-
pearances [and so forth for all geometrical figures].14 
The inference from 1 to 2 does seem to hold, as long as we real-
ize that we are talking about some kind of logical contradiction in 
constructing a cube (or any other geometric shape) with fewer or 
more corners than required by its definition rather than some failure 
1 3 1 will again refrain from the inquiry into whether Van Cleve does Kant's 
argument from geometry justice—for if Van Cleve's argument is to go through, 
it has to be valid on the parameters he establishes first, which I again deny. 
1 4 VC 35. Brackets mine—add qualifications VC himself makes to his argu-
ment in subsequent passages. 
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of our imagination. However, this likely requires an analytic view of 
geometry, while Kant is dedicated to geometrical knowledge being 
synthetic. Either way, let us accept that this inference is a priori, as it 
depends upon logical possibility, and grant the inference for the sake 
of argument at this time. 
The proposition in 3 invokes the necessity of such a priori knowl-
edge for geometrical knowledge—for "if the inference from 1 to 2 
were not legitimate, I could not know that no cube anywhere has 
more than eight corners, but...I do know this." 1 5 So a priori knowl-
edge of geometrical figures is necessary for us to have any universal 
knowledge of them, or as Van Cleve puts it, "the validity of the infer-
ence from 1 to 2 is a necessary condition of our having geometrical 
knowledge."1 6 
In moving from 3 to 4, Van Cleve argues, Kant asks himself what 
would be metaphysically necessary (in the world, not for us) for the 
inference from 1 to 2 to be valid. Kant's answer, mysteriously still, is 
that space and time cannot be things-in-themselves. Thus, for now I 
am willing to grant premises 1-3 as true on whatever grounds Kant 
or Van Cleve wish they be accepted. The tricky part here is how we 
get from premises 1-3 to premise 4: the denial of the inference from 
1 to 2 if cubes were things in themselves. This is the NA—why must 
the necessity of our possessing certain knowledge of something a 
priori necessarily rule out that those very things we possess a priori 
as knowledge (or more correctly for the NA, as pure forms of intu-
itions) must be denied objective reality in the realm of the noume-
nal? 
Van Cleve considers two objections to this argument, the first be-
ing the synthetic v. analytic dispute over the conception of geometry, 
which as I mentioned above would undermine premise 3. I parallel 
Van Cleve and just accept that Kant is right about this, as for the 
purposes of this inquiry as it has no bearing on Van Cleve's response 
to the NA. Though it would certainly defeat the argument if Kant is 
wrong about geometric knowledge being synthetic, which he likely 
is once non-Euclidean geometries are considered, my purpose is to 
address proposed solutions to how and why Kant himself moves from 
1 5 VC 35. 
1 6 VC 35.. 
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premise 3 to premise 4 in the historical context of Kant's sole com-
mitment to Euclidean geometry. 
The second objection Van Cleve considers, however, is analogous 
to the objection that is the focus of this paper: 
Why does the legitimacy of the 1-2 inference preclude the pos-
sibility that some things in themselves are cubical? Could it not 
be the case that the laws of geometry govern not only the con-
structions that are possible for human beings, but also the con-
figurations that are possible among things in themselves. Per-
haps (as Kant sometimes charges) that would be an implausibly 
preestablished harmony, but what rules it out? 1 7 
Here is where Van Cleve draws the appropriate parallel, acknowl-
edging that this objection to the argument from geometry is a spe-
cial case of the NA. Here also is where we get Van Cleve's promise 
to provide an answer to this objection. At the very least, we should 
expect some sort of credible answer to the special case if not the 
more generalized claim. 
Attempting to Explain Away the Neglected Alternative 
In proceeding with his argument for why the NA is not a problem 
for Kant, I would like to first point out that Van Cleve does ask some 
of the right questions—it is only in his answers that he goes astray. 
Van Cleve acknowledges that the specific objection to the argument 
from geometry has bite (and assumedly, he also thereby acknowl-
edges the more general concern of the NA), as it could certainly 
be the case that the 1-2 inference could be truth-preserving if cubes 
were things in themselves.18 He then suggests that the question to 
be answered is not whether it is possible for the noumenal realm to 
also be spatial and temporal. Instead, "our question...is under what 
conditions the 1-2 inference would be necessarily valid—not just con-
tingently truth-preserving."19 
1 7 VC 36. 
1 8 VC 36. 
1 9 VC 36. 
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To add support to Kant's requirement for a necessarily valid proof, 
Van Cleve suggests the reader consider: 
What further assumption would be needed to get from 1 to 2. 
The assumption that immediately suggests itself is this: cubes, 
and spatial figures generally, exist only in the construction of them. 
That is why the constraints on what we can construct are also 
constraints on all spatial objects: such objects exist only in being 
constructed.2 0 
To this "immediately suggestive" assumption, Van Cleve makes 
the following qualifications 
1. A cube (or other spatial object) need not be constructed in 
the mind—it can be perceived. 
2. Kant seems to allow that objects exist even if they have not 
actually been intuited—Van Cleve saves his 2W1MD approach 
to Kant by acknowledging that such objects can exist consistent-
ly with his idealism in that they would be intuited under certain 
conditions.21 
Van Cleve then ignores the second objection (assumedly because 
it is the one that actually threatens his basis for his entire project) 
and proceeds to cash out how making this simple assumption about 
Kant (2W1MD) solves the NA. 
With the 2W1MD underwriting the inference from 1 to 2 as val-
id, Van Cleve argues that this makes premise 4 "quite compelling." 2 2 
I take his reasoning to be this: since spatial objects only exist when 
being constructed, and since we cannot possibly and correctly con-
struct any spatial objects that defy their defining qualities (cubes hav-
ing more than eight corners), and since we are the only ones that 
construct spatial objects, there simply cannot be any spatial objects 
that defy our logical conception of them. If cubes were things in 
2 0 VC 36. 
2 1 VC 36-37. One cannot help but think this is quite a blow to Van Cleve's 
2W1MD—after all, now we have objects existing independently as long as they 
would be intuited were someone to come upon them and perceive them. It 
seems someone much more committed to realism could hold the same thing, 
especially if they think that all things that exist are those that can be perceived. 
2 2 VC 37. 
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themselves, things we cannot experience and have no a priori knowl-
edge of, let alone independent of us for their existence, the inference 
from 1 to 2 would not be necessarily valid; we could never be certain 
there were not cubes out there with more than eight corners that 
defy our constructive capacities but nevertheless exist. 
My Response 
Something certainly seems fishy, or unconvincing at best, with 
Van Cleve's proof. One almost might have the feeling that Van Cleve's 
solution to the NA is about as unjustified as Kant's outright rejection 
of the possibility in the first place. If this is the intuition the reader 
has, I have successfully recounted Van Cleve's argument—for in at-
tempting to offer an answer to Kant's NA, Van Cleve has his own 
"neglected alternative" premise that essentially begs the question, 
and certainly does not establish the type of necessary validity of the 
inference from 1 to 2 that Van Cleve seeks. A formalization of Van 
Cleve's argument should make help the unjustified move clearer. 
Argument for 2W1MD: 
PI. Kant is an "honest-to-goodness" idealist (i.e., Berkeleyan ide-
alist) 
P2. All appearances are mind-dependent for their existence 
(from 1). 
P3. All appearances are spatial (and temporal) (i.e., a posterio-± 
CI. All spatial (and temporal) appearances are mind-dependent. 
Van Cleve's Revised Argument from Geometry: 
P4: We cannot construct [visualize] any cubes with more than 
eight corners (or, any polygons that do not have at least three 
sides, etc.) 
P5. Spatial figures exist only in the construction [visualization] 
of them (Assumed Premise) 
P6: Therefore, there cannot be any cubes with more than eight 
corners. 
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P7. The inference from 1 to 2 must be valid for us to have knowl-
edge of cubes (spatial figures). 
P8: The inference from 1 to 2 would not be necessarily valid if 
cubes (spatial figures) were things in themselves (things that 
were not dependent upon us for their existence) 
C2: Cubes are not things in themselves (and by analogy, neither 
are space and time) 
First of all, note that (C1) is a conclusion about spatial appearanc-
es. Van Cleve's 2W1MD only extends to the phenomenal realm when 
making claims such as "appearances being the way they are means 
those very appearances (and their qualities), must completely depend 
upon us for their very existence (qualified existence, of course, as 
"virtual objects")." Van Cleve's 2W1MD leaves the noumenal realm 
completely alone, as things that do exist independently from us and 
about which we can have no knowledge. 
Second, note what follows from (P4) and (P5), keeping ( C I ) 
in mind. (P5) must be about appearances to be derived from Van 
Cleve's idealism, for it is something we can construct via 1) pure in-
tuition or 2) empirical intuition, and only appearances depend upon 
us on Van Cleve's view.2 3 Since (P5) is in the same language as (P4), 
(P4) must be about appearances as well. However, this means that 
what follows from (P4) and (P5) to justify (P6) in the proof is not 
that there cannot be noumenal spatial figures—only that there cannot 
be phenomenal spatial figures with more than eight corners. For an 
argument depending upon what we can construct, when we are the 
very source of those constructions, only tells us what can or cannot 
be for our constructions—it tells us nothing about the noumenal realm 
that is admittedly independent of us. 
Next, consider Van Cleve's move to find an assumption that 
makes the inference from 1 to 2 in his original version of the argu-
ment necessarily valid. The inference only seems to meet the necessarily 
valid criteria if we have an assumption that completely rules out any 
possibility for cubes with more than 8 corners. Kant certainly seems 
to want to rule out noumenal spatial figures, as beyond our empiri-
cal experience, from serving as a possible counterexample to our 
" V C 5, 36-37. 
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certainty of geometric knowledge. However, Van Cleve's 2W1MD, 
serving as the omitted assumption, effectively locks Kant further into 
knowledge of only the phenomenal realm rather than transcending 
to a negative ontological claim about the noumenal. 
If Van Cleve's argument tempts anyone, it is because of the am-
biguous language of (P5), suggesting that all spatial objects (phe-
nomenal and noumenal) exist only when constructed, and thus if 
we cannot construct them and we are their source, there cannot 
ontologically be any. This is why I say his assumed premise, serving 
ambiguously, begs the question—it must be read as such, and thus 
beg the question, in order to go through. Only by reading it in the lat-
ter sense do you get a valid argument, necessarily valid or not. Read 
as it should be, it is simply invalid. 
Conclusion 
Considering all this as nothing more than an answer to the ne-
glected alternative, just throwing out the argument that—1) since all 
spatial appearances are mind-dependent, and 2) that since we cannot 
conceive of spatial figures other than a certain way, that C) there-
fore no spatial objects can exist independently of us—simply does 
not follow or must beg the question—that all spatial things are merely 
appearances. Even were we to grant that Kant was such a Berkeleyan 
idealist as Van Cleave makes him out to be, Van Cleve's "to be is 
to be perceived" only concerns appearances. Van Cleave still has to 
admit, and does, that Kant is also a noumenalist. That appearances 
must depend on us for their Sein in order to depend on us for their 
Sosein (which is highly controversial, but even IF it was the case) only 
grounds the assertion that the existence of phenomena (Sein), as 
well as the phenomena being spatial (Sosein) depends upon us. It says 
nothing about the impossibility of noumena being spatial. Finally, 
the further textual evidence Van Cleave offers for his interpretation, 
as it best supports the Copernican Revolution, gains no further trac-
tion—for the 'objects' under discussion in relation to Kant's "revolu-
tion" must also be phenomenal, not noumenal. 
Thus, Van Cleve simply does not provide any helpful solutions or 
explanations for the neglected alternative. He does not adequately 
address either of the criteria outlined in my introduction for sub-
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stantively responding to the objection, though he does hint at Kant's 
motivation—that Kant in some way seeks to establish certain synthetic 
a priori knowledge (such as math, geometry, and science) as neces-
sarily valid in order to protect them from relativism. Whether Van 
Cleve's "honest-to-goodness" idealist interpretation of Kant has mer-
it in answering other "problems from Kant" I leave to the reader 
or other commentators—I am only certain it does not and cannot 
help with the infamous neglected alternative objection. Either way, 
Van Cleve's main problem for this inquiry is not (though it certainly 
doesn't help) asserting esse est percipi. It attempts to make an argu-
ment valid via petittio princippi. 
